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Abstract:  
 
This paper addresses the possibility of a correlation between inflation and investment for countries 
with inflation below 20%. The existing literature typically finds no correlation below this level of 
inflation. By instrumenting with an extensive set of political stability and regime variables I have 
shown that within a lower range of inflation rates, between 5% and 9%, this correlation is positive, 
highly significant, and shows no signs of reverse causality. 
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Introduction 
 
 The Mundell-Tobin effect states that an increase in inflation causes an increase in capital 
investment, and in turn, an increase in growth. In contrast to Mundell [1963, 1965] and Tobin 
[1965], another line of thought argues that high inflation can lead to high inflation variability, 
and this variability decreases investment and growth. Demetriades [1989] cites many authors 
who have found a positive relation between inflation variability and the level of inflation, while 
Davis and Kanago [1996] cite many authors who have found support for the negative relation 
between inflation uncertainty and growth. Aizenman and Marion [1993] even investigate what 
they call inflation surprises and its negative impact on investment. Empirical support for a 
negative relationship specifically between investment and inflation that is not channeled through 
inflation variability can be seen in Greene and Villanueva [1991], Fischer [1993], and Barro 
[1996]. However, this evidence for a negative inflation and investment (or growth) relationship 
is tenuous. As Temple [2000] observes, the relationship does not hold for countries with low 
inflation (typically below 15 or 20%), and for higher rates, the correlation is mostly influenced 
by the existence of a few outliers [Kirshner, 2001]. 
 In recent work, authors have argued that the lack of a correlation between inflation and 
investment in low inflation countries reflects the fact that inflation itself is an endogenous 
variable. To overcome this problem, one can use instrumental variables for current inflation. One 
strand of literature uses variables such as lagged inflation, central bank independence, or a 
limited set of political stability and/or regime characteristics [Barro, 1996; Cukeirman et al., 
1993]. Using political variables as instruments makes sense if inflation is primarily driven by 
monetary policy, and/or political instability. In this paper, I also use political variables as 
instruments, but extend the list to include a more extensive set of political stability and regime 
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variables gathered from the political science literature.  
As potential instruments, I consider a set of 39 political variables on 76 countries 
spanning 15 years. I then regress the natural log of the investment to GDP ratio on the estimates 
of the natural log of inflation attained from the instruments both before and after the data is 
cropped. The cropping of the data is critical in this study to determine a set of countries where 
there exists either a positive or negative bivariate relationship. It must be mentioned at this point 
that the author's purpose of this study is not to explore the inflation/investment nexus in the same 
way other studies have--studies that have found no relationship. In fact, empirically the literature 
has become stagnate on this particular topic; but common sense will tell anyone that investment 
behavior in a country with 2% inflation should be different from investment behavior in a 
country with 15% inflation. This hypothesis is further supported when considering the vast 
amounts of literature that positively correlate inflation with inflation variability. In essence, it is 
not my objective to be necessarily "proper" in my data exploration and estimation; but to explore 
the data more deeply to extract areas of significant correlations in order to get the existing 
literature over this perpetual 'hump'.  
In each regression I show that politics explains a large portion of inflation and this 
politically influenced inflation explains a large portion of the variation in investment. Finally, I 
find that there exists a positive non-linear bivariate relationship between investment and inflation 
up to approximately 9% inflation. It is this significant influence of inflation on investment within 
this low range of inflation rates that has been lacking in previous cross-country studies. Ahmed 
and Rogers [2000] also find a positive relationship between inflation and investment for a time 
series study of the United States; however, it is in cross-country studies where this relationship 
has not previously been found. Thus the Mundell-Tobin effect may be valid for low inflations, 
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and for high inflations, the costs of inflation may dominate.   
The paper is organized as follows; section 1 reviews the current literature on the 
relationship between politics and inflation. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 estimates the 
inflation/politics relationship. Section 4 displays plots of estimated inflation on investment and 
builds a priori reasoning as to what the empirical results should be. Section 5 estimates the 
investment/inflation relationship and checks for feedback from investment to the inflation 
instrument, while section 6 is the conclusion.  
 
1. Inflation and Politics 
Many have tried to overcome the difficulty of dealing with the endogeneity issue when 
evaluating the impact of inflation on investment and growth. As stated by Barro [1998], “. . . an 
inverse relation between growth and inflation would arise if an exogenous slowing of the growth 
rate tended to generate higher inflation. This increase in inflation could result if monetary 
authorities reacted to economic slowdowns with expansionary policies. Moreover, if the path of 
monetary aggregates did not change, then the equality between money supply and demand at 
each point in time implies that a reduction in the growth rate of output would tend automatically 
to raise the inflation rate.” 
 
Several ways of correcting for this endogeneity bias include using as instruments a 
measure of central bank independence (the most commonly used determinant of inflation), 
lagged inflation, institutional factors such as historical or contemporaneous colonial status, 
whether a country is ruled under a democracy or dictatorship, and political stability indices such 
as the number of attempted coups or riots. With the exception of lagged inflation, all of the 
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above potential determinants of inflation are political in nature. In the search for determinants 
of inflation, this seems to be the most logical course to take. Kirshner [2001] states that “. . . all 
monetary phenomena are fundamentally political.” He also states that the most commonly used 
determinant of inflation–central bank independence (CBI)–“represents a political outcome” that 
in turn affects growth. It is more likely that CBI is a function of either a regime variable (such as 
whether a government is ruled under a democracy or a dictatorship), a legislative variable (such 
as whether a government is a parliamentary democracy or a presidential democracy), or a 
stability variable (such as the number of times a government head has been overthrown). My 
view is further supported by Banaian and Luksetich [2001] who state that measures of CBI “. . . 
may simply be proxies for political and economic freedoms that are more important checks of 
political manipulations of the economic system.” 
It seems that measuring inflation via CBI aggregates the institutional and stability effects 
and could reduce the correlation between CBI and investment. Even though some economists 
have used other political measures as noted above, the set of measures seems to be limited in 
scope. The political science literature, as Kirshner recognizes, has generated a much more 
expansive set of these measures that should be utilized in economics. The data set that I use is 
described below. 
 
2. The Data 
I use a data set compiled by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (PACL) and 
evaluated in their book Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in 
the World, 1950-1990. The set includes 6 regime variables, and 33 stability and political 
transition variables.  A variable for inflation is also in their data set, but is acquired from the IMF 
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[1994, CD-ROM] and is defined as the annual rate of growth of the consumer price index.  
PACL’s data set covers 135 countries yearly from 1950 to 1990 for some countries, with 
most covering fewer years. I modify the data as follows. First, to eliminate possible serial 
correlation in the residuals, I use 5-year intervals rather than yearly.  Second, it seems to make 
little sense to run regressions with political stability indices that measure such things as riots and 
coups, or a regular change-over of presidents using unbalanced panels. In such a case some 
countries will unduly influence the results if their political variables are allowed to vary over a 
longer period of time than other countries; quasi-balanced panels should provide uniform results. 
My data set covers 76 countries at five year intervals with all data beginning in 1970 and 
typically ending in 1985 (the appendix lists these countries). The average number of observations 
per country is 3.9. The investment to GDP ratio has been obtained from the Penn World Tables 
version 5.6 [Heston, et al., 2002]. I do realize that the time dimension of the political data set 
limits this study's ability to determine the effects of inflation on investment during the 1990's. I 
would argue that evaluating data prior to 1990 is actually desirable.  
It is well-known that growth in the decade of the 90’s was largely driven by a wealth 
effect due to stock and real estate markets worldwide. This effect had an unsystematic impact on 
the variability of prices during this decade [Martin and Rowthorn, 2004; Guo, 2004].  For policy 
purposes in estimating the impact of inflation on investment in the future, since the inflation in 
the stock market has arguably subsided, I suggest it is more useful to use data prior to 1990 
rather than after that date.  
 
3. Inflation and Politics: The Estimates 
I first estimate a within regression where I include all 33 stability and political transition 
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variables using a process of elimination based on statistical insignificance. I then include each 
regime variable one at a time keeping the one that is significant. Taking the model to this 
parsimonious form is mostly due to the fact that leaving in all variables, even if most variables 
are statistically insignificant, will influence the estimated values of inflation and may artificially 
influence investment in later regressions. To correct for heteroskedasticity and heterogeneity in 
the conditional variance, I use a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression method. 
The heterogeneous part was the inclusion of the region of Oceania in the auxiliary regression that 
determined the weights. The estimates from the final model are below. 
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Table 1: Instrument Regression 
 
The statistically significant independent variables are (i) Institutions, (ii) Age, (iii) 
Democracy to Dictator, (iv) Percent Democracies, (v) Openness, and (vi) Transitions to 
Democracy. The squared terms have no a priori implication for inclusion in the regression; they 
simply corrected the original failing of the Respecification Error Test (RESET) developed by 
Ramsey [1969]. It can easily be shown that if the residuals are a function of quadratic 
 
The dependent variable is 
the natural log of inflation 
 
Estimate  P-value T-statistic 
 
Institutions 
 
Age 
 
Democracy to Dictator  
 
Percent Democracies 
 
Openness 
 
Transitions to Democracy 
 
Age Squared 
 
Transitions Squared 
 
 
0.281 
 
0.024 
 
1.418 
 
3.807 
 
0.009 
 
1.152 
 
-0.0001 
 
-0.064 
 
0.011 ** 
 
0.001 ** 
 
0.000 ** 
 
0.000 ** 
 
0.000 ** 
 
0.000 ** 
 
0.034 ** 
 
0.000 ** 
 
2.55 
 
3.40 
 
5.03 
 
4.79 
 
4.08 
 
3.98 
 
-2.13 
 
-3.72 
 
Number of observations:              293 
Adjusted R2                                  0.832 
Avg # obs per country                  3.9 
F-test on fixed effects                  F(77,213) = 3.53         P-value = 0.000 
 
FGLS regression with the region of Oceania in the auxiliary regression.  
The dependent variable is the natural log of inflation.  
** indicates significance at 5%. 
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determinants used to model the mean (sometimes known as omitted variables), the estimators 
will be biased [Spanos, 1986; Patterson, 2000]. Below I state the definitions of these variables, 
the implications of the coefficient estimates, and possible explanations for these estimates. It 
must be warned that the explanations given for the estimated influence of the political variables 
on inflation are highly subjective and incomplete. Research on the political economy of inflation 
is beyond the scope of this paper.
(i)  Institutions: Classification of political regimes in which democracies are 
distinguished by the type of executive. This variable is coded 0 if dictatorship, 1 if parliamentary 
democracy, 2 if mixed democracy, 3 if presidential democracy. Transition years are coded as the 
regime that emerges in that year. 
The positive coefficient on Institutions implies that as a country becomes more 
democratic, inflation increases. One explanation may be that democracies are breeding places for 
special interest groups who make competing demands for shares of the economy, and together 
these shares are greater than the economy’s total product. This excess demand may be inflation 
generating [Hirsch, 1978].   
(ii)   Age: Age in years of the current regime. 
This correlation is positive over the observation range and implies that the longer a 
current regime is in power, the higher the inflation of that country. The reason for this positive 
influence may be that the longer a regime is in power, the more vulnerable it may feel and the 
government may not be able to resist from caving in to social pressures and will increase the 
money supply to boost short term output [Kirshner, 2001].  
(iii) Democracy to Dictator: Dummy variable coded 1 for a year in which a dictatorship 
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follows a democracy, 0 otherwise. 
The positive coefficient on Democracy to Dictator implies that there is higher inflation in 
the years following a transition from a democracy to a dictatorship. Given that (i) implies that a 
democracy has higher inflation than a dictatorship, the reason for this positive correlation may 
seem a puzzle. Arguably in such a regime change there may be a decrease in output and a 
transitory increase in inflation. It could also be argued that prices rise due to the uncertainty 
surrounding the policy of the dictator, or that the dictator increased the stock of money by decree 
to quickly generate revenue.  
(iv)  Percent Democracies: Percentage of democratic regimes in the current year (other 
than the regime under consideration) in the world. 
The positive coefficient on Percent Democracies implies that the greater the percentage 
of democracies in the world, the higher is inflation in the country under consideration, and as 
democracies have higher inflation rates as shown in (i), this phenomena may simply be 
representative of spillover effects from the democratic countries.  
(v)  Openness: The sum of exports and imports divided by GDP.  
Openness implies that the more a country is involved in trade, the higher the inflation in 
that country. My explanation for this result is simply descriptive and is based on previous results. 
If dictatorships have lower inflation, as indicated by the positive relation of Institutions, and if 
dictatorships are less open than democracies, then we would expect a positive relationship 
between openness and inflation. On the other hand, at first glance, this result does contradict the 
general conclusion reached by Romer [1993]. 
Romer’s conclusion is based on the theory that countries with coordinated monetary 
policies act as a single, less open economy. A less open economy reduces the harm of real 
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depreciation caused by surprise monetary expansion and raises inflation. Romer’s empirical 
work shows a statistically significant negative relationship between openness and inflation for a 
broad set of countries. Once mean heterogeneity is controlled for and separate regressions run for 
different regions and developed nations, this correlation disappears. In fact, when taking into 
consideration the standard errors of the parameters, a 95% confidence interval would actually 
include sizeable positive values of the parameters. Given that my data set differs from Romer's, a 
positive relationship in this case may not totally be in conflict with previous studies. 
(vi) Transitions to Democracy: The sum of past transitions to democracy in a country. 
The correlation is positive over the observation range and could be explained with the 
same stability-type argument as in (iii). This result could also hinge on a time horizon argument 
following a political business cycle rationale [Nordhaus, 1975; Allen, 1986]. In essence, 
governments with short time horizons may increase the money stock in the short run to increase 
the likelihood of re-election [Kirshner, 2001].  
In general, democratic governments have higher inflation as well as countries that 
practice more liberal trade policies. Extreme regime transitioning from democratic to 
authoritarian rule adds to inflationary pressures on the one hand; but countries with regimes that 
stay in power for extended periods and countries whose governmental regimes transition 
frequently also adds to inflation.  
It is important to recognize that these six political variables, including the fixed effects, 
account for over 83% of the variation in inflation. When I run a standard regression on only the 
political variables not including the fixed effects, the adjusted R2 is still 0.78. We must be 
cautious with this result because the calculation of the adjusted R2 assumes a constant mean, yet 
the implication here remains that the political variables explain a good portion of the variation in 
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inflation. This is important because it is these estimates of inflation that I use below for the 
instrument in the investment regressions. 
4. Investment and Inflation: The Initial Plot 
As noted in the previous section, over 83% of inflation can be explained by governmental 
characteristics and country specific effects. This implies that the endogeneity problem between 
inflation and investment can be remedied by estimating the natural log of the investment to GDP 
ratio on the estimates of the natural log of inflation attained from the above regression (of course, 
formal testing is still needed to determine whether the instrument is truly exogenous and will be 
addressed in the next section). As a preliminary exercise, I explore this relationship graphically. 
Figure A plots the natural log of the investment to GDP ratio on the estimated natural log of 
inflation from the regression in Table 1. 
Figure A: Uncropped Panel Data 
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A general pattern emerges where there is a slight negative correlation on the front and 
back of the figure, with the center seeming to have a quadratic form. Dropping the countries with 
observations that could be deemed as outliers makes these features stand out, and also avoids the 
criticisms made earlier.  
The determination of which observations can be considered as outliers is purely 
subjective on my part. Davies and Gather [1993] even state that there is no precise definition for 
an outlier. They go on to state that the ". . . outlier identification problem is not to determine 
which, if any, observations are contaminants but rather to specify those observations that lie in a 
particular region." In the context of this paper the region under consideration is the region within 
which the observations could obviously be driving a particular result in both a panel and a time-
averaged cross-section plot. It is important to remember that the purpose of this study is to search 
the data for systematic components that were overlooked by previous authors. The results below 
can only tell the story of the inflation/investment relationship within the resulting group of 
countries that have inflation rates within a particular range. Figure B is the cropped panel data 
while Figure C is a plot of the same countries as in B but averaged over time to reduce any likely 
business cycle effects. 
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Figure B: Cropped Panel Data 
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Figure C: Cropped Cross-Section Data 
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In Figure B, we see that an obvious non linear pattern emerges where there is an inflation 
rate (or range of inflation) that maximizes investment. Figure C supports the claim that the non-
linear pattern is maintained even over a 15 year span. This is probably the most exciting 
discovery for several reasons. The first is that business cycles in the 1970's and 1980's were 
much shorter than recently; the 15 year average probably does a sufficient job in eliminating 
these effects. Second, the contemporaneous observations from Figure B may be capturing 
feedback from investment to many of the political variables that make up the CPI variable. 
Consequently, by averaging over longer periods, it seems a reasonable conclusion that many of 
these effects would decrease in significance. To support these claims, I next extend my analysis 
econometrically. 
 
5. Investment and Inflation: The Estimates 
The first regression I run is a simple one of the natural log of the investment to GDP ratio 
on the estimated natural log of inflation using the data that constructed Figure A. I do not use a 
within regression method as I did with inflation because with country-specific effects captured in 
the inflation estimates, it is not needed--I do include regional effects that are common to the 
literature (i.e., North America, South America, Africa, Europe, Oceania, and Asia).  
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Table 1: Estimates of uncropped data  
 Panel Model Cross-section Model 
Variables Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values 
 
Inflation 
 
North America 
 
Oceania 
 
Europe 
 
Africa 
 
Asia 
 
Constant 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.202 
 
0.306 
 
0.317 
 
-0.489 
 
-0.029 
 
3.020 
 
0.176 
 
0.034 ** 
 
0.063 * 
 
0.000 ** 
 
0.000 ** 
 
0.759 
 
0.000 ** 
 
-0.043 
 
-0.212 
 
0.299 
 
0.314 
 
-0.500 
 
-0.036 
 
3.039 
 
0.480 
 
0.215 
 
0.314 
 
0.055 * 
 
0.004 ** 
 
0.834 
 
0.000 ** 
 
No. of Obs. 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
 
293 
 
0.327 
 
 
76 
 
0.364 
The dependent variable is the natural log of the investment to GDP ratio. 
South America is the control group. 
* indicates significance at 10% 
**indicates significance at 5% 
 
What we find above is the typical negative correlation that other authors get when 
regressing investment on inflation (Barro [1996] gets an estimate of -0.059 when using lagged 
inflation as an instrument, and -0.044 when using prior colonial status as an instrument).
Viewing Figure A once more, and taking into consideration the estimates above, it is reasonable 
to assume that the ‘front’ and ‘back’ observations are negatively correlated with investment, and 
therefore, I drop the corresponding countries from the data set and proceed to respecify the 
model (this model is estimating Figures B and C). I correct the misspecification of this model by 
checking for possible non-linearities in the data, and also perform FGLS regressions to account 
for heterogeneity in the conditional variance as I did above for the inflation regression (the 
regions of Africa and Oceania were included in the auxiliary regression of the FGLS system for 
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the panel model; no regional heterogeneity was found in the cross-section case). The results 
are below.  
Table 2: Estimates of cropped data 
 Panel Model Cross-section Model 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
 
Inflation 
 
 
Inflation Squared 
 
 
North America 
 
 
Oceania 
 
 
Europe 
 
 
Africa 
 
 
Asia 
 
 
Constant 
 
0.495 ** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
-2.237 
(0.493) 
 
33.113 ** 
(0.000) 
 
6.599 ** 
(0.030) 
 
-14.641 ** 
(0.000) 
 
0.752 
(0.808) 
 
24.055 ** 
(0.000) 
 
2.190 ** 
(0.000) 
 
-0.599 ** 
(0.000) 
 
-4.756 ** 
(0.001) 
 
20.463 ** 
(0.000) 
 
3.259 ** 
(0.001) 
 
-13.110 ** 
(0.000) 
 
-3.313 ** 
(0.009) 
 
17.067 ** 
(0.000) 
 
0.061 
(0.759) 
 
 
 
 
-0.321 * 
(0.063) 
 
0.262 ** 
(0.042) 
 
0.262 ** 
(0.013) 
 
-0.520 ** 
(0.003) 
 
-0.183 
(0.186) 
 
2.839 ** 
(0.000) 
 
5.880 ** 
(0.009) 
 
-1.371 ** 
(0.008) 
 
-0.358 * 
(0.058) 
 
0.209 * 
(0.058) 
 
0.283 ** 
(0.022) 
 
-0.487 ** 
(0.003) 
 
-0.221 
(0.188) 
 
-3.162  
(0.178) 
 
No. of Obs. 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
 
225 
 
0.789 
 
 
225 
 
0.954 
 
 
58 
 
0.418 
 
 
58 
 
0.522 
 
The dependent variable is the natural log of the investment to GDP ratio. 
South America is the control group. 
Estimated using Huber/White robust errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
* indicates significance at 10% 
**indicates significance at 5% 
 
 
 The first thing that should be noticed from table 2 is that adding the squared inflation 
term greatly improved the fit of the model. According to models 2 and 4, we find that the 
Mundell-Tobin effect may be a valid explanation for inflation rates from approximately 1 to 6% 
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and 5% to 9% respectively; after that the relationship reverses. The reversing of this 
relationship indicates that the costs of inflation must outweigh the benefits from the Mundell-
Tobin effect. The results from models 2 and 4 do differ quite dramatically in terms of the 
function's estimated optimum--6% versus 9%. In light of this dichotomy, several statistical issues 
should be addressed.  
 The first issue hinges on the possibility that the political instruments for inflation may not 
be totally correcting for the endogeneity bias at least in the panel data model where each 
observation of estimated inflation is matched with a contemporaneous observation of investment. 
Setting aside the fact that the literature has also used similar forms of the statistically significant 
political variables as instruments for inflation in one study or another, in deciding whether these 
variables are truly exogenous I proceed to test the possibility of feedback.  
 To test whether there remains an endogeneity problem, I ran a Durbin-Wu-Hausmann 
(DWH) test using the regional effects as instruments for estimated inflation [see Davidson and 
MacKinnen, 1993, pgs. 237-242]. The first stage of this test is to run a regression of the 
estimated inflation on the regional effects which are known to be exogenous then estimate the 
residuals. This effectively separates the exogenous part of inflation from the endogenous part--
although imperfectly because it assumes that all of the exogenous information can be captured in 
the exogenous regional effects; having a lack of truly exogenous variables from which to draw, 
this is the best I can do. I then plug residuals back into the original regression and test their 
significance.  
 According to the DWH test, the p-value returned for the null hypothesis of our inflation 
instrument being truly exogenous was 0.001 and 0.683 for the panel and cross-section models 
respectively. According to the DWH test, the cross-section model is the more legitimate model. 
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The feedback from investment to inflation in the panel case can be easily explained as a 
business cycle phenomena whereby autonomous increases in levels of investment lead to 
contemporaneous increases in aggregate demand and therefore increases in short-run prices. 
Whatever the reasoning, the more interesting result remains the longer-run relationship between 
investment and inflation of which the cross-section model is the legitimate source of this 
correlation. 
 A second problem that may be influencing the estimated optimum of inflation's 
functional form could arise if the parameters themselves are not stable over the observation set. 
Since I have already controlled for country and regionally-specific fixed effects, an atypical 
approach to testing this misspecification problem must be taken.  
 The standard approach used often in time series work would be to run a Hansen [1992] 
test for parametric stability of both the mean coefficients as well as the conditional variance, 
however, a coherent ordering of the data would be required. The ordering I chose is by regions. 
Ordering by regions can expose possible parametric instability in the slope coefficients even if 
the intercept is allowed to vary by region. The test statistics returned for coefficient stability in 
the linear and non-linear inflation estimators as well as the conditional variance respectively are 
0.095, 0.194, 0.523 for the panel model, and 0.164, 0.096, and 0.254 for the cross-section model. 
The 5% cutoff for the null hypothesis of stable parameters for these statistics is approximately 
0.50 indicating that the null of stable parameters is upheld for all except the conditional variance 
in the panel case which borderline fails the hypothesis test.  
 A third bone of contention that may arise is that there could be theoretically omitted 
variables that are correlated with both investment and inflation. I contend that this is definitely a 
possibility if (1) we were directly considering inflation where in this study we are actually 
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considering inflation's instruments--i.e., in essence a completely different variable from 
inflation itself, or (2) I didn't voice the intention at the outset that the only relevant relationship in 
the context of this paper is the bivariate relationship between investment and inflation. In fact, I 
would argue that in every regression run in the history of economics (or, for that matter, any 
other field that uses non-experimental data) there will always be some variable that could 
theoretically be considered as an omitted variable. Having said this, at least with regard to the 
cross-section specification, the model appears to be statistically adequate and adheres to the 
standard probabilistic assumptions that fall from OLS estimation. To this end, given the stated 
problems above, the only model I will interpret with any valid inference in order to reduce the 
arguments of the naysayer will be the cross-sectional model.   
 
6. Conclusion: 
The purpose of this paper was to implement a broader set of political stability variables as 
instruments for inflation. With the limited set of instruments currently in use, a correlation 
between inflation and investment has been non-existent across low inflation countries. 
By using a set of 39 political variables, I have found that 7 can account for nearly 80% of 
the variation in inflation. While the explanations of the estimates of these variables are 
speculative, the explanations make intuitive sense. Democratic governments have higher 
inflation as well as countries that practice more liberal trade policies. Extreme regime 
transitioning from democratic to authoritarian rule adds to inflationary pressures on the one 
hand; but on the other hand, countries with regimes that stay in power for extended periods as 
well as countries whose governmental regimes transition frequently also adds to inflation.  
By using estimated inflation determined by these 7 political variables, I plotted the 
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natural log of the investment to GDP ratio on the estimated natural log of inflation for an 
initial assessment of the correlation between the two. What I found was that there are obvious 
non-linear patterns in the data with areas of positive correlation. Econometrically, I have found 
that for inflation rates from approximately 1 % to 6 % in the contemporaneous panel case, and 
5% to 9% in the cross-section case, investment is positively correlated with inflation. Regarding 
these results a caveat is justified. 
We must remember that one of the purposes of this study was to delve more deeply into 
the standard data in order to search for some sort of statistically significant relationship between 
inflation and investment in relatively low inflation countries--a relationship that has yet to be 
found. Whether the reader agrees with the methodology used in this study especially with regard 
to the ‘data mining’ that occurred by subjectively dropping the front and back outliers of Figure 
A, he/she should not negate the fact that among the remaining 58 countries there exists a 
significant positive correlation from 5% to 9% inflation. While this study cannot say much with 
regard to the 18 countries that were dropped, or the many countries that were never even 
included in the data set, if the policymakers of these 58 countries got together to explore 
common inflation targeting, maybe the proper target should be moderate levels of inflation rather 
than the current policy of low inflation based on ad hoc or non-existant empirical relationships.
Further areas of research regarding this issue should focus less on developing versus 
developed country relationships, and correlations that are broad enough to appeal to policy 
makers from many countries, and focus more on the transitioning areas of positive to negative 
investment/inflation relationships. From this, research could possibly start to address the 
structural differences in economies and politics that may generate these transitions.
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Appendix 
76 Country List 
 
ALGERIA 
BURKINA FASO 
BURUNDI 
CAMEROON 
CONGO 
GABON 
GAMBIA 
GHANA 
IVORY COAST 
KENYA 
MOROCCO 
NIGERIA 
RWANDA 
SOUTH AFRICA 
TOGO 
TUNISIA 
ZAMBIA 
ZIMBABWE 
CANADA 
COSTA RICA 
DOMINICAN REP. 
EL SALVADOR 
GUATEMALA 
HONDURAS 
*JAMAICA 
*MEXICO 
 
 
*NICARAGUA 
*PANAMA 
TRINIDAD&TOBAGO 
U.S.A. 
*ARGENTINA 
*BOLIVIA 
*BRAZIL 
*CHILE 
*COLOMBIA 
ECUADOR 
PARAGUAY 
PERU 
*URUGUAY 
VENEZUELA 
*CHINA 
INDIA 
INDONESIA 
IRAN 
*ISRAEL 
JAPAN 
JORDAN 
KOREA, REP. 
*MALAYSIA 
PAKISTAN 
PHILIPPINES 
 
 
*SINGAPORE 
SRI LANKA 
SYRIA 
THAILAND 
AUSTRIA 
BELGIUM 
*CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
DENMARK 
FINLAND 
FRANCE 
GREECE 
*ICELAND 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
NORWAY 
PORTUGAL 
SPAIN 
SWEDEN 
*TURKEY 
U.K. 
*YUGOSLAVIA 
AUSTRALIA 
NEW ZEALAND 
 
Note: The asterisk marks those countries that are NOT in the 58 country sample. 
 
